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Welcome to Gene C. Colman's Family Law Centre |
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SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT FAMILIES AND THE CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINES - A CALL FOR REFORM Introduction:
The
Guidelines standard table amount of child support should reflect the total
number of children for which the payor is responsible, whether or not that payor
is living separate and apart from any particular child. Primacy
of the family in thought but not always in action: The
injustice done to second and subsequent families in Canada is truly a black mark
on our justice system. On the one
hand, we tout the primacy of the family; yet, on the other hand we tend to
impoverish the second and subsequent family.
Public policy tends to preserve and protect the financial integrity of
the custodial parent’s part of the first family unit. Our
intent to treat all equitably in theory is mandated in the Guidelines: 1. The objectives of these Guidelines are … (d) to ensure consistent treatment of spouses and children who are in similar circumstances. Ontario’s
Family Law Act states in its preamble: Whereas
it is desirable to encourage and strengthen the role of the family; and whereas
for that purpose it is necessary to recognize the equal position of spouses as
individuals within marriage and to recognize marriage as a form of partnership; The
federal and Ontario objectives are directed at those who are embroiled in
separation and divorce. Certainly,
we should strive to treat those similarly situated in a similar fashion.
Canadians pride themselves on being ‘fair’ and even handed.
However, why should children of intact second and subsequent families be
treated any less fairly than previous children of separated families?
Why should we continue to promote what amounts essentially to a punitive
approach against payors who have children in second or subsequent relationships?
What does that say about how we are treating their entirely innocent
children? We
give lip service as a society to the importance of family.
However, when we have to make choices with respect to supporting the
integrity of families, we invariably adopt an unnecessarily punitive approach
against support payors (usually men) even though such an approach does harm to
children of second families, let alone to the children of the first marriage!
[For an analysis of our system’s punitive approach to men and its
derivation from gender bias and stereotyping, please see Gene
C. Colman, Gender Bias: Where are We?, National Family Law Program 2000,
Federation of Law Societies, Volume II – reproduced at this web site.] Our
social policy does not make any sense: There
is no valid policy reason to favour one family over another.
Children do not choose whether to be born of a first marriage/union or a
subsequent marriage/union. Why
should children be treated differently? Our
social policy makes no logical sense and even less human sense.
We now recognize families where the parents do not marry because we are
(in part) concerned for the children and the financial support that we mandate
they receive. We have long gone past recognizing common law spouses
and their rights and we are now in the process of recognizing families where the
parties are of the same gender; we are in the process of extending to such
unions most, if not all the rights and privileges of married heterosexual
partners. For example, same gender
couples are increasingly gaining the right to adopt children. All of this revolutionary social policy is in the name of
recognizing families – no matter what their configuration (sexual or
otherwise). Surely if our social
policy recognizes non traditional families through legislation and case law,
then should it not logically follow that we provide equal recognition and indeed
substantive protection to children of second and subsequent families? We
are a liberal, permissive society. Anything
goes - except when it comes to men who are required to pay child support.
Those men we tend to denigrate and demonize.[See the writer’s article
referred to above.] Those men we
tend to label as ‘deadbeats’ and impute to them all sorts of nefarious
motivations. For example, there are
instances in the case law of judges excoriating men who dare to have children of
subsequent unions – such men are criticized for having the gall to make more
children when they should have given priority to the children of the first
marriage. [For one example, see paragraph 44 of Camirand
v. Beaulne, 1998 CarswellOnt 2216, [1998] O.J. No. 2163, 160 D.L.R. (4th)
749 (Ont. Gen. Div.), Aitken, J.] Our
social policy in favour of families and children breaks down abominably when
faced with the choice of being fair to all children versus demonizing support
payors and making them pay amounts of child support that serve to severely
prejudice if not impoverish children of second and subsequent families. Demonization
of support payors – men: The
demonization of support payors has been ably documented in the ten million
dollar U. S. federal research study conducted by Professor Sanford Braver.
[Sanford Braver and Diane O’Connell: Divorced
Dads: Shattering the Myths. The
surprising truth about fathers, children and divorce, Penguin-Putnam, New
York, 1998] Braver set out to
examine why men appeared to disengage from their children post divorce.
While he found that this was indeed a problem, it did not exist to the
same extent as others had suggested. Braver
came to examine the myths and stereotypes that drive U.S. public policy.
Applying the critical analysis of a social scientist, he scientifically
and most convincingly shattered the major myths that drive U.S. public policy
around fathers and divorce. This
author heartily recommends this book to policy makers. We learn from Braver that the common myths simply do not
stand up to rigorous scientific analysis.
Two of these myths are:
It
would be beyond the scope of this paper to examine how Braver shatters the
myths. This author can only suggest
that policy makers simply read the book. It’s
an easy read and well worth the minimal effort as it helps the reader to develop
the intellectual tools to critically examine the means of data collection and
analysis in the mounds of social science literature that masquerades as
scientific research. A grasp of
Braver’s work will greatly assist policy makers to be critical of all data and
subject such data to rigorous analysis that heretofore has apparently been
lacking. Sensible
basis for social policy: If
we proceed then from two very basic assumptions: 1.
that public policy ought not to be driven by the demonization of men;
and, 2. that children of all
marriages and relationships ought to command an equitable share of the
father’s resources (based upon income) – then it follows that the “undue
hardship” provision of the Guidelines is totally inadequate to address
the latter concern and no simple technical amendment can really fix the problem.
We need a paradigmatic shift in attitude. “Guidelines’
Undue Hardship Produces Conflicting Decisions”, Money & Family Law, Vol.
13, No. 7, July 1998 - reproduced
at this author’s web site.
]
The case law emphasizes for us
that mere “hardship” is acceptable under the law.
Only ‘undue’ hardship, if proven, gives the court some discretion to
deviate from the standard table amount. The
net effect of the Guidelines and the case law is that second and
subsequent families are forced to struggle under what amounts to impossible
financial responsibilities in many cases. Policy
should demand that we recognize legitimate claims to support from all children
of the payor: Treating all
children of a payor (usually the man) equitably demands that public policy
through the Guidelines recognize that the amount of child support to be
paid reflects the total number of children for which the payor is responsible.
(A small number of cases have adopted this approach.) In other words, if payor A
had three children with wife #1, became divorced from wife #1, and then was
living with wife #2 where he had financial responsibility for two more children,
then payor A should be required to pay wife #1 three fifths of the table amount
on account of the three (of his five) children who were residing with wife #1.
This approach per force would equitably recognize the legitimate
claims of the children from a first relationship that had broken down as well as
the legitimate claims of the children of any subsequent union where the
relationship had not broken down (or even had broken down).
We
must recognize that payors (usually men) do not always have unlimited resources
(even though they are frequently treated by the courts as if they do). Payors often have various financial responsibilities that are
not even recognized in child support law. (One
explicit example of this philosophy is the Guidelines mathematical design
that specifically assumes, against all logic and common sense, that the
non-custodial parent has absolutely no child care expenses.
See Federal Child Support Guidelines: A Technical Report, Research Report
CSR-1991-1E, Department of Justice, December 1997, particularly at page 2.) While not recognizing the payor’s legitimate expenses to
exercise access to his children, the law also takes little if any cognizance of
the payor’s true ability to pay. This
policy consideration is obviously beyond the scope of this short paper.
Suffice it to say, that our meat chart approach leaves us with very
little room to deviate from the standard table amount.
Predictability trumps fairness and compassion.
At least in the area of second and subsequent families, we can perhaps
alleviate and ameliorate the most blatant area of injustice in Canadian child
support law and practice. New
section needed: It follows
then that section 10 of the Child Support Guidelines is totally
inadequate to deal with the problem. We
need a new section in the Guidelines to implement such policy. Such policy would no more encourage men to have more children
than it can be said that ordering the full table amount against various men in
loco parentis encourages women to collect serial father figures in
successive relationships. Conclusion: This
writer fully recognizes that adoption of such an equitable approach would result
in some children obtaining less of their father’s resources than at present. However, this writer maintains that such an approach is the
only fair means of dealing with children of second and subsequent relationships.
The least that we can do as a society is treat the children fairly, even
where we might have little or no inclination to treat the payors
compassionately. |